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CLD-236        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2141 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES LEWIS MATTHEWS, 
 Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. CriminalNo. 08-cr-00124-003) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or 
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 26, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 17, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Charles Lewis Matthews, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his 
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motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Because this 
appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 In April 2009, Matthews pleaded guilty to one count of a superseding information 
charging him with distribution and possession with intent to distribute an undisclosed 
quantity of cocaine base.  21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The Plea Agreement noted that the 
maximum penalty was 20 years of imprisonment.  The Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”) indicated that Matthews was responsible for 353 grams of crack cocaine.  Under 
the Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, that drug quantity (between 150 and 500 grams 
of cocaine base) resulted in a base offense level of 32.  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  That level was 
reduced by two points for acceptance of responsibility.  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  But, because 
Matthews had two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, he was 
classified as a career offender.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  As a career offender, Matthews‟ 
sentencing range was determined based on the table in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).  United 
States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  That table provides that a career 
offender who faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison has an offense level of 32.  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  Factoring in the same two-level downward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1, Matthews‟ total offense level was 30.  With a mandatory Criminal History 
category of VI, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), Matthews faced a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 
months of imprisonment.  In a Judgment entered July 17, 2009, the District Court 
sentenced Matthews to 210 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of 
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supervised release.   
 We affirmed on direct appeal.  United States v. Matthews, 373 F. App‟x 303 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Matthews next filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The District Court denied the § 2255 motion on the 
merits.  United States v. Matthews, No. 10-cv-1549, 2011 WL 183979 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 
2011).    
 In January 2012, Matthews filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence in 
light of Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.
1
  The District Court denied the 
motion and Matthews appealed.
2
  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of a district court‟s interpretation of the Guidelines is de novo, United States v. 
Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2009), and we review a district court‟s ultimate 
disposition of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion.  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154 & 
n.2. 
                                                 
1
 The District Court liberally construed Matthews‟ claims as being brought pursuant to 
Amendment 750, even though he did not cite that Amendment in his § 3582 motion.  
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).  Instead, Matthews relied on Amendment 
706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which “decrease[d] by two levels the base offense level 
for crack cocaine offenses.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 219 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Amendment 706 became effective on November 1, 2007, several years before Matthews‟ 
July 2009 sentencing.  Under the plain language of § 3582, Matthews is ineligible for a 
sentence reduction based on Amendment 706.  § 3582(c)(2) (permitting a court to lower a 
sentence where the applicable sentencing range was “subsequently . . . lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission.” (emphasis added)). 
 
2
 Although Matthews‟ notice of appeal was filed more than 14 days after the District 
Court entered its order denying the § 3582(c)(2) motion, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), the 
Government has not sought to enforce the time limitation.  Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 
620 F.3d 321, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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 A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(2) “only 
when two elements are satisfied:  First, the defendant must have been „sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by 
the Sentencing Commission;‟ and second, the sentence reduction must be „consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.‟”  United States v. 
Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2009).  The applicable policy statement provides that a 
sentence reduction is not authorized if the retroactive amendment “does not have the 
effect of lowering the defendant‟s applicable guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2).  
In this regard, “the policy statement and § 3582(c)(2) are complementary.”  Doe, 564 
F.3d at 310. 
 Amendment 750, which took effect on November 1, 2011, lowered the base 
offense levels for crack cocaine quantities listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), to conform to 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”).3  In Mateo, we held that career offenders 
sentenced under § 4B1.1 are ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief in light of Amendment 706, 
which, like Amendment 750, lowered the base offense levels for certain quantities of 
                                                 
3
 The FSA amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) by, among other things, raising the amount of 
crack cocaine that triggered mandatory minimum prison sentences.  See Dorsey v. United 
States, -- U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-29 (2012).  In response to the FSA, the 
Sentencing Commission promulgated a temporary amendment that revised the crack 
cocaine quantity levels in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.  Amendment 750 re-promulgated as 
permanent that temporary amendment.  Id. at 2329.  Although the Commission decided 
that Amendment 750 should be applied retroactively, see United States v. Curet, 670 F.3d 
296, 309 (1st Cir. 2012), the FSA itself is not retroactively applicable, where, as here, 
both the offense and sentencing occurred before its enactment.  United States v. Reevey, 
631 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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crack cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154-55.  This is because 
“Amendment 706 only affects calculation under § 2D1.1(c), and the lowering of the base 
offense level under § 2D1.1(c) has no effect on the application of the career offender 
offense level required by § 4B1.1.”  Id. at 155.  Similarly, because Matthews was 
sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1, Amendment 750 does not affect his 
applicable sentencing range.  Cf. United States v. Lawson, -- F.3d --, 2012 WL 2866265, 
at *3 (11th Cir. July 13, 2012) (holding that Amendment 750 did not lower sentencing 
range for defendant whose “offense level and guideline range . . . were based on § 4B1.1, 
not § 2D1.1, because he was a career offender.”).  Thus, we conclude that Matthews is 
not eligible for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to Amendment 750, and the District 
Court did not err in denying his § 3582 motion to reduce his sentence.   
 We also reject Matthews‟ reliance on Freeman v. United States, -- U.S. --, 131 S. 
Ct. 2685 (2011).  In that case, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a district court 
may grant a § 3582(c)(2) reduction based on subsequently amended Guidelines where the 
defendant entered a guilty plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(c)(1)(C), which allows the parties to bind the district court to a pre-agreed sentence if 
the court accepts the plea.  Id. at 2690.  Here, by contrast, Matthews‟ guilty plea did not 
include a pre-agreed sentence pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C).  See Lawson, 2012 WL 
2866265, at *2 (noting that Freeman did not “address[] defendants who were assigned a 
base offense level under one guideline section, but who were ultimately assigned a total 
offense level and guideline range under § 4B1.1.”).  Moreover, we recently held that 
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“Mateo remains good law” following Freeman.  United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 
285, 286 (3d Cir. 2012).   Finally, although Matthews appears to rely on United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that case does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction 
not otherwise permitted under § 3582(c).  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155-56. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  
